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ABSTRACT: 
Purpose: The chapter studies the impact of fiscal policy on the stabilization of peace in the aftermath of a civil 
war. 
 
Methodology: We use data from African war-torn countries and study the issue of post-conflict stabilization 
from an empirical perspective. We employ probit analysis to formally estimate the effect of fiscal policy on the 
probability of maintaining peace in the post-conflict period. 
 
Findings: The success of post-conflict transition does not require downsizing the government. On the contrary, 
successful post-conflict transitions are on average characterised by an increase in the size of the government. 
However, both expenditures and revenues increase at a comparable pace. Moreover, in successful post-conflict 
transitions, the increase in government size involves an increase in the incidence of capital expenditure relative 
to government consumption. On the revenue side, budgetary grants appear to strengthen the chances of success. 
A heavier debt burden does not seem to compromise the probability of successfully completing the post-conflict 
transition.   
 
Research limitations/Implications: Future research should (i) extend the sample to non-African countries, (ii) 
extend the analysis to other macroeconomic policy variables, and (iii) supplement cross-country analysis on the 
role of fiscal policy with country case studies. A potential application of the findings of this chapter is the 
construction of a model to predict the evolution of currently ongoing post-conflict transitions.  
 
Social implications: The findings bear implications on how governments should conduct fiscal policy in the 
aftermath of a conflict. They also provide guidelines for the international community on how best to assist post-
conflict economies.  
 
Originality: Papers concerned with the determinants of peace in the post-conflict period do not generally look 
at the potential contribution of fiscal policy. This chapter is the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to 
provide econometric evidence on the role of fiscal policy as a possible driver of peace stabilization in the 
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Purpose: The chapter studies the impact of fiscal policy on the stabilization of peace in the 
aftermath of a civil war. 
Methodology: We use data from African war-torn countries and study the issue of post-
conflict stabilization from an empirical perspective. We employ probit analysis to formally 
estimate the effect of fiscal policy on the probability of maintaining peace in the post-conflict 
period. 
Findings: The success of post-conflict transition does not require downsizing the 
government. On the contrary, successful post-conflict transitions are on average characterised 
by an increase in the size of the government. However, both expenditures and revenues 
increase at a comparable pace. Moreover, in successful post-conflict transitions, the increase 
in government size involves an increase in the incidence of capital expenditure relative to 
government consumption. On the revenue side, budgetary grants appear to strengthen the 
chances of success. A heavier debt burden does not seem to compromise the probability of 
successfully completing the post-conflict transition.   
 
Research limitations/Implications: Future research should (i) extend the sample to non-
African countries, (ii) extend the analysis to other macroeconomic policy variables, and (iii) 
supplement cross-country analysis on the role of fiscal policy with country case studies. A 
potential application of the findings of this chapter is the construction of a model to predict 
the evolution of currently ongoing post-conflict transitions.  
 
Social implications: The findings bear implications on how governments should conduct 
fiscal policy in the aftermath of a conflict. They also provide guidelines for the international 
community on how best to assist post-conflict economies.  
 
Originality: Papers concerned with the determinants of peace in the post-conflict period do 
not generally look at the potential contribution of fiscal policy. This chapter is the first 
attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to provide econometric evidence on the role of fiscal 
policy as a possible driver of peace stabilization in the aftermath of a conflict.  
 
 





Conservative estimates suggest that in the five decades following the end of World War II the 
total death toll generated by civil wars is five times higher than the interstate death toll. More 
than 70 countries (roughly one third of the total membership of the United Nations system) 
experienced episodes of large-scale civil violence, most of which produced massive refugee 
flows and economic devastation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Given these figures, it is not 
surprising that the causes of civil war have become the object of a recent, lively literature at 
the intersection of economics and political science (see, inter alia, Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 
Collier et al. 2008a; Miguel et al. 2004; Lujala et al. 2005; Humprehys, 2005). Within this 
avenue of research, specific attention is now being devoted to the aftermath of a conflict
1. As 
empirically shown by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the risk of a civil conflict decreases with 
the time elapsed since the last civil conflict. The implication is that the post-conflict period is 
particularly risky and hence it is important to study the conditions for the consolidation of 
peace in the aftermath of a conflict.  
The available empirical evidence indicates that the maintenance of peace during the post-
conflict transition critically hinges upon the interaction of political and economic factors. 
Among those latter ones, the literature gives prominent relevance to the level and growth of 
per-capita GDP and the degree of dependence on natural resources (see Collier et al. 2008b). 
Not much attention has been instead devoted to the role of macroeconomic policies, 
particularly fiscal policy. The case studies reported in Boyce and O’Donnell (2007) 
emphasize the importance of public finance in re-building state institutions following a civil 
conflict. Collier (2009) discusses reforms and strategies that post-conflict economies ought to 
undertake to increase revenues and to strengthen the effectiveness of spending. However, 
cross-country evidence on how different dimensions of fiscal policy affect the probability of 
successfully completing the post-conflict transition is still missing. In other words, from the 
perspective of a policymaker in a post-conflict country it would be important to be able to 
answer questions like: Should governments focus more on government consumption or 
public investment? Should governments worry about the stabilisation of public finance 
(eventually downsizing government) or expand the public sector? Is the burden of debt going 
to be a cause of post-conflict failure? What is the contribution of budget grants to peace 
stabilization? However, the existing research leaves these (and related) questions largely 
unanswered. 
The purpose of this chapter is to fill in the void through an econometric analysis of the links 
between fiscal policy and post-conflict peace in African countries. The focus on Africa is 
justified on two grounds. First, about half of all civil wars have taken place in Africa and 
even today several countries on the continent are torn by civil conflicts and/or go through a 
difficult post-conflict stabilization. In this sense, one can argue that Africa is a good case 
study for researchers interested in the dynamic interaction between economics and conflict. 
Second, an econometric analysis of the type we have in mind requires sufficiently 
comprehensive fiscal policy data and these are often not available for many post-conflict 
countries. However, for the specific case of Africa, the Africa Development Database of the 
World Bank provides a valuable source of information. Combining this database with country 
sources we collected from national statistical offices, we have been able to construct a panel 




period 1965-2008. Of course, the dataset has several missing observations, especially at the 
beginning of the sample. Still, it contains enough data points for us to be able to apply formal 
regression analysis tools. 
 
The theoretical prior of our analysis draws on the game-theoretic analysis of international 
relations and military interactions (see for instance O’Neill, 1994). In the aftermath of a 
conflict, the stability of peace depends on whether or not the fighting parties will stick to the 
peace agreement. This peace agreement can be represented as the allocation of a peace payoff 
between the contending parties. The larger the payoff and the more equitable the distribution, 
the longer peace will be maintained. Our argument is that fiscal policy is one of the key 
determinants of the size of the peace dividend. At the same time, it is through fiscal policy 
that the “winner” (the government) can make the allocation of the dividend more or less 
equitable. The size and scope of government expenditure, the incidence of taxation, and the 
burden of debt are therefore likely to be important drivers of peace stabilization. To test this 
hypothesis we will be looking at how fiscal policy variables affect the probability of a 
country to successfully complete ten years of continued peace after the end of a conflict. We 
will also study how the dynamics of fiscal policy variables differ between successful and 
unsuccessful post-conflict stabilizations.  
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The success of post-conflict transition does 
not require downsizing the government.
2 On the contrary, successful post-conflict transitions 
are on average characterised by an increase in the size of the government. However, this 
increase occurs in such a way that the overall stability of public finances is not heavily 
compromised: both expenditures and revenues increase at a comparable pace. Moreover, in 
successful post-conflict transitions, the increase in government size involves an increase in 
the incidence of capital expenditure relative to government consumption (whose contribution 
to horizontal redistribution is questionable). On the revenue side, budgetary grants appear to 
strengthen the chances of success. At the same time, and perhaps contrary to common-sense 
intuition, a larger burden of debt does not seem to compromise the probability of successfully 
completing the post-conflict transition.   
 
In the rest of the chapter we present first a few simple empirical regularities concerning fiscal 
variables during the post-conflict transition. We then provide econometric evidence from the 
estimation of a probit model of post-conflict peace. Subsequently, we discuss the difference 
in the dynamic of fiscal policy between a successful and an unsuccessful post-conflict 
episode. Finally, we formulate some conclusions and policy recommendations. The Appendix 
reports the full chronology of conflicts in Africa and the description of the variables used in 
the analysis.  
 









For the purpose of this chapter, the post-conflict period is identified with the first ten years 
that follow the end of a conflict.
3 The chronology of civil wars for the African continent is 
based on Gleditsch (2004) and updated to 2008 (using the information available up to the end 
of 2009). The full chronology is reported in the Appendix.    
A post-conflict transition can be successful or unsuccessful. Success occurs when the country 
effectively stays at peace for the whole of the ten years. A failure instead occurs whenever a 
new war goes off within less than ten years from the end of the previous conflict. In the rest 
of the chapter, we refer to SPC as the successful post-conflict and UPC as the unsuccessful 
post-conflict. In the case of African countries, we count 15 successful post-conflict transitions 
and 15 unsuccessful post-conflict transitions. There are also nine countries that at the cut-off 
date of 2008 were still at peace, but had not yet completed the ten years spell. These are 
regarded as “ongoing” post-conflict transitions. All in all, the unit of observation in the 
dataset is a post-conflict episode and we include a total of 33 episodes.
4 For each episode, 
data are reported on an annual basis. Fiscal data fully cover 21 of the 33 episodes (11 SPC 
and 10 UPC). Another two episodes (notably Algeria SPC 1964-1973 and Burundi SPC 
1973-1982) are covered only partially. For the remaining 10 episodes, no fiscal data are 
available (see Appendix for details about the availability of fiscal data by country). 
 
As a way to gauge some simple empirical regularities on the behaviour of fiscal policy 
variables in post-conflict situations, Table 1 reports some basic summary statistics. For each 
of 24 fiscal policy indicators (see appendix for a full list of variables), the table reports the 
average (μ) and the standard deviation (σ) in UPC and SPC. To better appreciate the 
differences between successful and unsuccessful post-conflicts, the table also reports the 
standardised mean difference of each variable. This is equal to the average of the variable in 
SPC minus the average of the variable in UPC divided by the standard deviation of the 
variable in the full sample. Finally, the table also reports average and standard deviation of 
the fiscal variables in states of war and peace as references to compare the statistics computed 
for UPC and SPC. Note that by periods of peace, here we mean the years of peace that follow 
the end of successful post-conflict transition until the beginning of a new war (or until 2006, 
in case no new war has began since the conclusion of the last-one).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Focusing on the differences between UPC and SPC, there are indeed a few variables that 
exhibit a rather large (positive or negative) standardised mean difference. Both the level of 
debt (debt) and the incidence of interest payments on total expenditure (int_p) are much 
higher in SPC than in UPC. In fact, the standardised mean difference of debt is the largest of 















levels (and a larger incidence of interest payments on total expenditure) than UPC. This is 
indeed quite surprising as it suggests that the burden of debt might not be an obstacle to the 
maintenance of post-conflict peace. SPC is also characterised by a significantly larger level of 
current grants (grt_c). Therefore, it seems that providing post-conflict countries with 
budgetary grants is more conducive to peace than granting debt relief. We will return on this 
important policy conclusion later on, also addressing the issue of possible reverse causality. 
A large mean difference is also observed with respect to defence expenditure (def): in SPC 
defence and military expenditure is effectively much lower than in UPC. This observation is 
coherent with previous findings by Collier and Hoeffler (2006). Two issues are worth noting, 
however. First of all, the sample of observations is quite small. The variable def is not 
available for several of the episodes of unsuccessful post-conflict transition and hence we 
have to be careful in making generalizations. Second, reverse causality might be particular 
strong in this case: it is not necessarily a large military expenditure that causes the failure of 
the post-conflict transition, but rather, it might be that the expectation of a failure (possibly 
already evident in the first years of post-conflict transition) leads the government to spend 
more on the military.    
SPC is also characterised by larger levels of public education on expenditure (edu). 
Unfortunately nothing can be said about health expenditure as we have no observations on 
health for the countries in UPC). Bearing in mind that also for edu the number of actual 
observations in each state is small, the positive association between higher education 
expenditure and post-conflict success is coherent with the idea that the stabilization of peace 
requires a larger provision of public goods.  
Government size appears to be on average higher in UPC, but differences between successful 
and unsuccessful post-conflicts are relatively small. The only exception is represented by 
public sector wages (wages), which are larger in SPC. In fact, as it will be discussed later on, 
the critical difference between UPC and SPC with respect to government size is not related to 
average levels, but rather to dynamics in the first years of the post-conflict transition. With 
respect to composition of expenditures and revenues, we observe a rather larger incidence of 
government consumption on total expenditure (gov_p) in UPC. On the contrary, non tax 
revenues (rev_ntx and rev_ntx_p) are generally larger in SPC than in UPC. Reflecting the 
small differences in average government size across the two states, indicators of fiscal 
balance also do not differ much between UPC and SPC. If anything, SPC tends to display 
better balances than UPC when grants are included.  
 
Looking beyond averages: evidence from probit analysis 
We now move beyond period averages to estimate the effect of fiscal policy variables on the 
probability of successfully completing the post-conflict transition. Our statistical framework 
is the standard binary choice model. Let Y = 0 denote the SPC state and Y = 1 the UPC state. 
Given a set of country characteristics x, we can write the probabilities of being in each state 
as: 
(1)   
 
(2)   6 
 
where  β, the parameters to be estimated, represent the impact of changes in x on the 
probability of each state (see Greene, 2008 pages 772-774). The estimation of the β 
parameters then requires the specification of a functional form for the distribution on the right 
hand side of equations (2) and (3). Either the normal distribution or the logistic distribution is 
used in the literature. We experimented with both of them and we noticed that results are 
basically the same. We report and comment on results obtained using the normal distribution: 
(3)     
where Φ(•) denotes the standard normal distribution. 
The vector x includes, for each country in each period, a set of socioeconomic characteristics 
plus the fiscal policy variables. More specifically, we control for the quality of country’s 
polity (polity), the timing of elections (elections), the degree of ethnic fragmentation (ethnix), 
and the level and growth rate of per-capita gdp (gdp_pc and growth respectively). Level and 
growth of per-capita GDP and fiscal policy variables are all lagged to reduce the risk of 
reverse causality.
5  
Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects of model (2)-(3). The marginal effects are 
formally defined as  , where   are the maximum likelihood estimates of β. Because of 
the way in which we have coded the binary dependent variable, a positive sign indicates that 
higher values of the variable reduce the probability of a successful post-conflict transition. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Before discussing the role of fiscal policy variables, it is worth taking a look at the impact of 
other socioeconomic controls. Elections and a better polity increase the chance of a 
successful post-conflict transition. This intuitive result is however hardly statistically 
significant. Ethnic fragmentation also reduces the risk of returning to violence in the post-
conflict period. Both findings are consistent with the results reported by Collier et al. (2008). 
The role of per-capita income is instead ambiguous. The sign of the marginal effect of per-
capital GDP changes across different specifications of the x vector. However, when it is 
statistically significant, the marginal effect is positive, thus suggesting that richer economies 
are at higher risk of failure. This effect is however counter-balanced by the effect associated 
with the growth of per-capita GDP. The estimated coefficients on growth are again hardly 
significant in statistical terms. However their negative sign indicates that the quicker per-
capita GDP returns to its post-conflict level, the more likely it is that the post-conflict 
transition will end up successfully.   
We now turn to the estimated marginal effects associated with the fiscal policy variables. In 
the attempt to reduce multicollinearity, we employ a smaller group of variables than the 
original 24. In particular, we build on the evidence of the previous subsection to see whether 
the largest mean differences documented in Table 3 correspond to statistically significant 
effects on the probability of success/failure of the post-conflict transition.  
In column I of table 2 we look at expenditure variables. A higher level of total expenditures 







suggest the following interpretation. A larger government implies a larger (and possibly more 
equitably distributed) peace dividend, thus making it optimal for both contending parties to 
maintain peace. The proportion of government consumption on total expenditure (gov_p) 
instead has a negative effect on the probability of successful post-conflict transition. Our idea 
is that for any given size of the government, the value of the peace dividend increases faster 
the more resources are allocated to productive expenditure. In this sense, a greater incidence 
of consumption relative to investment is not beneficial to peace stabilization. However, 
public wages do help promote peace (as indicated by the negative coefficient on wages_p) as 
they make rebellion a less attractive option for a larger number of people.  
In column II we consider revenue variables. Total revenues (rev) do not play any statistically 
significant role, even though the negative sign is broadly in line with the idea that a larger 
government helps maintain post-conflict peace. A larger proportion of non-tax revenues 
(rev_ntx_p) instead reduces the probability of SPC. We believe that this effect is related to 
greed: non-tax revenues might capture the depth of fiscal exploitation of natural resources 
and hence they represent a rent that parties would like to appropriate with violence at some 
point in time during the post-conflict phase. Finally, more grants (grt_p_c) increase the 
probability of SPC. The effect is statistically large, meaning that grants significantly 
contribute to increasing the peace-payoff of the contending parties.  
We consider the impact of the burden of debt in column III. As expected from the analysis of 
mean differences, a higher debt to GDP ratio (debt) does not seem to be an obstacle to 
successful post-conflict transition. In fact, in our sample, SPC is characterised by a 
systematically higher level of debt than UPC. Higher debt levels are therefore associated with 
a higher probability of SPC. At the same time, the fact that higher debt levels also involve a 
larger amount of resources to be used for interest payments (int_debt_p) does not seem to 
matter much in terms of probability of success of the post-conflict transition.  
Finally, in column IV we look at the impact of the overall stability of the fiscal position. In 
fact, we tried all six different definitions of fiscal balance, and only bal_prim_grt happens to 
be statistically significant. A better primary balance (inclusive of grants) helps complete the 
post-conflict transition successfully. Our interpretation is that the enlargement of government 
size in the post-conflict phase is conducive to peace only if it involves both the expenditure 
side and the revenue side of the budget. On the contrary, if only expenditures are expanded 
(especially government consumption) than the chances of success do not necessarily increase.  
 
Dynamic comparisons 
We now turn to the analysis of the dynamic evolution of fiscal policy variables during the 
post-conflict transition. To this purpose we compute averages of fiscal policy variables in 
each state as follows. Let wijt be the generic fiscal policy variable w observed at time t in 
country i in state j (where j = SPC, UPC). Then, the average taken over all is in state j at time 
t is wjt =  , where n is the total number of countries in state j at time t. For each 
period t, the average of fiscal policy variables is defined as wj(t)=  , where T = 1, 
2...up to 10 (if j = SPC) or the start of a new conflict (if j = UPC). The sequence of wj(t) 
values therefore offers a dynamic representation of how the fiscal policy variable evolves 
over time in each state.  8 
 
To highlight differences in the dynamic evolution, in Table 3 we report the difference wSPC(t) 
– wUPC(t) for t = 1, 2..5. The entire series wSPC(t) and wUPC(t) are reported in Tables 4 and 5, but 
we limit our investigation to the first five years of post-conflict transition because, the 
number of countries in UPC is very small after the fifth year. The trends of some of the key 
fiscal policy variables are also depicted in figure 1. 
INSERT TABLES 3, 4, 5 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
It appears from the table that SPC is initially characterised by lower revenues (rev) and lower 
expenditures (exp) than UPC. Revenues and expenditures grow during the first five years of 
transition in both SPC and UPC. However, while the average growth rate of expenditure is 
roughly the same in the two states (1.8% per year in UPC and 1.7% per year in SPC), the 
growth rate of revenues is significantly faster in SPC (2.7% per year versus 0.45% per year 
on average in UPC, see panel A of Figure 1). Therefore, a distinctive feature of successful 
post-conflict stabilizations is that the expansion of government size is matched by the 
increase in revenues, so that the overall fiscal position is not significantly destabilised. 
At the beginning of the post-conflict transition, SPC is also characterised by lower levels of 
capital expenditure (exp_k), current expenditure (exp_c), and government consumption (gov) 
than UPC. However, the evolution of these components of expenditure in the first few years 
of transition is quite different across the two states. In the UPC state, the expansion in total 
government expenditure mostly takes the form of an increase in government consumption, 
while capital expenditure in proportion of GDP declines. On the contrary, in the SPC state all 
of the three components increase, but capital expenditure increases faster than the other two 
(2.9% per year against an increase of 1.4% a year of current expenditure and 0.3% a year of 
government consumption). As a result of these trends, the incidence of government 
consumption in total expenditure (gov_p) grows fast in UPC, while it declines in SPC state 
(see panel B of Figure 1). 
The dynamic pattern of current grants (grt_c) is also quite interesting. The difference between 
SPC and UPC is quite small at the beginning of the transition. But then, the difference grows 
quickly during the first four years: while SPC is characterised by a steady increase in the flow 
of grants, UPC displays the opposite trend (see panel C of Figure 1). The fact that 
immediately at the beginning of the post-conflict transition grants are higher in the SPC state 
might suggest that the international community “picks-the-winner”: among all post-conflict 
countries, some are chosen and receive a larger initial endowment of grants, which in turn 
puts them in the condition to sustain peace over the post-conflict period. However, the fact 
that over time the gap in the level of grants between the two states widens might indicate 
some endogeneity in the behaviour of the international community: grants tend to go to those 
countries that show more promising progress towards peace, while countries that initially 
struggle in maintaining peace receive less and less support. This sort of “disengagement” of 
the international community then leads to the failure of the post-conflict transition process.  
The data in the table also confirm our previous findings on the role of debt. Not only total 
debt (debt) is initially significantly higher in SPC (see panel D of Figure 1), but the difference 
also grows over time. In SPC, the level of debt moderately increases in percent of GDP over 
the first five years of transition (1.4% per year), while in the UPC state it decreases. The 
proportion of resources devoted to interest payments (int_p) is systematically and persistently 
higher in SPC than in UPC. These findings might seem at odds with the evidence recently 
reported by UNDP (2008) on the contribution of debt relief to post-conflict recovery. 
However, we stress that there are two important differences between our analysis and 9 
 
UNDP’s (2008). First of all, we look at different samples of post-conflict episodes. Second, 
UNDP is mainly concerned with the correlation between debt service and post-conflict 
growth, while we look at how, after controlling for growth, debt affects the probability of 
stabilizing peace. In other words, we look at the role of debt from a sharply different angle 
than UNDP.   
Finally, the analysis of the dynamics of military, education, and health expenditure is once 
again severely affected by the lack of data. The dynamic comparison must indeed be limited 
to the very first years of transition. It appears that SPC is effectively characterised by lower 
military expenditure (def). This expenditure also declines steadily (more than 8% per year) 
throughout the first five years of post-conflict transition. The decline seems however to be 
even faster in the UPC state in the first two years of transition. However, we have to stress 
that much of this decline is driven by the variations in the size of the military in Angola. Most 
of the other countries in UPC increase, albeit only marginally, their military expenditure 
between the first and the second year of post-conflict transition.   
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have studied the role of fiscal policy in determining the success or failure 
of post-conflict transition. Our idea is that fiscal policy is relevant because it can significantly 
affects the payoffs of the conflicting parties, thus strengthening (or weakening) their 
commitment to the peace agreement. We have then looked at the issue from an empirical 
perspective. Using a large collection of fiscal policy variables for the group of war-torn 
African countries, we have found that the fiscal dimension does matter, even after controlling 
for other possible determinants of war and peace. With respect to the specific case of the post 
conflict transition, our key results can be summarised as follows. The success of post-conflict 
transition does not require downsizing the government. On the contrary, successful post-
conflict transitions are on average characterised by an increase in the size of the government. 
However, this increase occurs in such a way that the overall stability of public finances is not 
heavily compromised: both expenditures and revenues increase at a comparable pace. 
Moreover, in successful post-conflict transitions, the increase in government size involves an 
increase in the incidence of capital expenditure relative to government consumption (whose 
contribution to horizontal redistribution is questionable). On the revenue side, budgetary 
grants appear to strengthen the chances of success. At the same time, and contrary to 
common-sense intuition, a larger burden of debt does not seem to compromise the probability 
of successfully completing the post-conflict transition.  
From our results we can draw a few policy recommendations that we believe are also relevant 
to non-African post-conflict countries. First of all, countries in post-conflict transition should 
not pursue fiscal stability through a reduction in the size of government. On the contrary, 
there is need for a larger government in the first years after a war, so government expenditure 
should increase. However, this increase should not significantly exceed the rate of expansion 
of revenues. With the end of the conflict, the potential for tax collection will increase and 
government ought to strengthen their efforts in this direction. A balanced expansion of 
revenues and expenditures is likely to be more conducive to the success of the post-conflict 
transition than government downsizing.  
Second, while expanding the overall size of the government, countries should also adjust the 
scope of the government. In this context, it appears to be important to promote capital 10 
 
expenditure, which is expected to strengthen the peace dividend over time.
6 The proportion of 
government consumption in total expenditure should correspondingly decrease and possibly 
more space should be given to targeted forms of redistribution to address horizontal 
inequalities between the fighting parties. Unfortunately we have limited data on education 
and health expenditure, but the little evidence we presented seems to suggest that the 
reallocation of resources from the military to the provision of public education and health will 
strengthen peace through two complementary effects: (i) a larger peace dividend and (ii) 
dynamically efficient redistribution. 
Third, financial assistance in the form of budgetary grants might be more important than debt 
relief in the first years of post-conflict transition, at least from the perspective of maintaining 
peace. Because the debt burden does not appear to affect the chances of success, while grants 
do, the international community should consider a new approach in assisting post-conflict 
economies: in the immediate after-math of a war, debt cancellation ought to be replaced by 
direct budgetary assistance to compensate the weak capacity of governments to mobilize 
domestic resources. Of course, in the medium term, debt cancellation will remain important 








We would like to thank Oumar Diallo, the editors Jurgen Brauer and Ben Goldsmith, 
participants at the Third Australasian Conference on the Economics and Politics of War and 
Peace (Sidney 26-27 June 2009), and participants at the 32
nd Conference of the African 
Studies Association of the Australasia and Pacific (Brisbane 30 September – 2 October 2009) 
for very helpful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors and 
inconsistencies. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the official position of the United Nations Economic Commission for 







Name   code  Definition
  Fiscal variables in percent of GDP  
(source: African Development Indicators, World Bank,  




Exp  Total expenditure and net lending includes both current and capital 
(development) expenditures and includes lending minus repayments.  
Total revenues   Rev  Total revenue and grants equals the sum of government revenue and 
grants. Revenue includes all nonrepayable and nonrepaying 
government receipts other than grants. Grants are defined as 
unrequited, nonrepayable, noncompulsory receipts.  
Government 
consumption 
 Gov  Current expenditure on goods and services comprises payments of 
wages and salaries in cash to employees (including the armed forces) 
before deduction of withholding taxes and employees' contributions to 
social security and pension funds, as well as employers' contributions 
to superannuation schemes outside government, and other purchases 
of goods and services (wages and salaries in kind, office supplies and 
maintenance charges etc.).  
Wages and 
Salaries 
Wages  Wages and salaries consist of all payments in cash, but not in kind, to 
central government employees in return for services rendered, before 
deduction of withholding taxes and employees contributions to social 
security and pension funds.  
Current 
expenditure 
exp_c  Total current expenditure includes requited payments other than for 
capital assets or for goods or services to be used in the production of 
capital assets, and unrequited payments for purposes other than 
permitting the recipients to acquire capital assets. 
Capital 
expenditure 
exp_k  Expenditure for acquisition of land, intangible assets, government 
stocks, and nonmilitary and nonfinancial assets; also for capital grants 
and lending minus repayments.  
Defence 
expenditure 
 Def  Data generally cover expenditures of the ministry of defense (excluded 




Health  Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending 
from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and 
grants (including donations from international agencies and 




Edu  Total public expenditure is current and capital public expenditure on 
education plus subsidies to private education at the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels by local, regional and national 





rev_ntx  Receipts from sources other than the tax system, like property income, 
fees, fines, and contributions to government employee pension funds 
within government.  
External capital 
grants 
 grt_k  Grants are unrequited, nonrepayable, noncompulsory receipts of 
government from other governments or international institutions. In 
determination of the deficit/surplus, grants are grouped with revenue 
and expenditure rather than with financing.  
Total current 
grants 
 grt_c  Grants include grants from other foreign governments, international 
organizations, and other government units.  
Total 
government debt 
 Debt  Debt is the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual 
obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It includes 
domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, 
securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of 
government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial 





bal_ov_grt  Defined as Total revenue including current grants minus total 






bal_ov  Defined as the overall budget balance including current grants minus 






bal_c_grt  Defined as total current revenues including grants minus total current 






bal_c  Defined as the current budget balance including current grants minus 






bal_prim_grt  Defined as total revenue including grants minus current expenditure net 






bal_prim  Defined as the primary budget balance including grants minus total 
current grants (author’s definition) 
 
        
  Fiscal variables in proportion of revenues and/or expenditures 
(source: African Development Indicators, World Bank, 





exp_c_p  Current expenditure in proportion of total expenditures 
Government 
consumption 
gov_p  Government consumption in proportion of total expenditure 
Wages and 
salaries 
wages_p  Wages and salaries in proportion of current expenditure 
Interest on debt  int_p  Interest accrued on outstanding domestic and external debt in 
proportion of current expenditure 
Non tax 
revenues 
rev_ntx_p  Non tax revenues in proportion of total revenues 
    
Other variables 
Per_capita gdp  Gdp_pc  GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. Data are expressed in constant US dollars and log-
transformed. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Growth  Growth  Annual percent change of per-capita GDP. Source: World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Ethnix  Probability that two randomly selected individuals are not of the same 
ethnic group. Source La Porta et al. (1999).  
Quality of the 
polity 
Polity  Quality of the polity defined in terms of democracy and autocracy. The 
variable takes values between -10 (absolute autocracy) and +10 
(perfect democracy). Source: Polity IV database.  
Time of elections  Legelec  Dummy variable taking value 1 in years when a legislative election was 





Chronology of civil wars in African countries and availability of fiscal data 































1995-1997   1980 
Mozambique 1979-1992 
 










1999-2008     1984 
Sierra Leone  1991-1996 
1998-2000 
 
 1997  2001-  1980 
South Africa  1989-1993 
1999-2002 
 





1973-1982 1993-1994 2006-  1984 
Zimbabwe 1972-1979 
 





















1962-1971     1980 
Democratic 







1994-1995 2001-  1996 
Congo 1997-1999 
 







1989-1995 2002-  1984 
Ethiopia 1974-1991  1992-2001     1981 
Sources: Gleditsch (2004) and CIA World Factbook (2009 issue). Fiscal data are taken from the African 




Boulding, K.E.(1946), The Economics of Peace, Prentice Hall, New York.  
 
Boyce J.K. and O’Donnell, M. (2007), Peace and the Public Purse, Centre on International 
Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism, Rienner publishers, London. 
Collier, P. (2009), “Post-conflict Recovery: How Should Strategies Be Distinctive?”, Journal 
of African Economies, vol. 18, i99-i131. 
 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998), “On economic causes of civil war”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, vol. 50, pp. 563-573. 
 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004), “Greed and greviance in civl war”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, vol. 56, pp. 563-95. 
 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2006), “Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies”, 
Economics of Governance, vol. 7, pp. 89-106. 
 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2008a), “Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility 
and civil war”, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 61, pp. 1-27. 
 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Soderbom, M. (2008b), “Post-conflict risks”, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 45, pp. 461-748. 
 
Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2003), “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political 
Science Review, vol. 97, pp. 75-90. 
 
Gleditsch, K. (2004), “A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 
1816-2002”, International Interactions, vol. 30, pp. 231-262. 
 
Greene, W. (2008), Econometric Analysis, sixth edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey.  
 
Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. and Gilmore, E. (2005), “A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable 
resource”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, pp. 538-562. 
 
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. (2004), “Economic shocks and civil conflict: an 
instrumental variables approach”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, pp. 725-753. 
 
O’Neill, B. (1994), “Game theory Models of Peace and War”, in Aumann, R. and Hart, S. 
(eds.) Handbook of Game theory, Volume 2, Elsevier Science, New York, pp. 996-1053.  
 
UNDESA (2005), Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance. World 
Public Sector Reform 2005. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
New York (http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan0216161.pdf) 
 17 
 
UNDP (2008) Post-conflict recovery: Enabling local ingenuity. United Nations Development 
Programme, New York (http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/eco_recovery.shtml). 
 
USAID (2005), Reforming Public Administration in Post-conflict Societies, U.S. Agency for 




Table 1: Summary statistics of fiscal variables 
UPC SPC  Standardised  War periods  Peace periods 
   μ  σ  μ  σ  mean diff.  μ  σ  μ  σ 
Government size 
Rev 0.221  0.921  0.209  0.403  -0.130  0.178  0.554  0.229  0.420 
Exp 0.270  0.594  0.254  0.339  -0.115  0.254  0.523  0.314  0.356 
Gov 0.116  0.707  0.097  0.392  -0.308  0.124  0.618  0.118  0.411 
Wages 0.054  0.678  0.056  0.488  0.037  0.060  0.792  0.069  0.540 
Government scope 
exp_c 0.163  0.735  0.164  0.415  0.009  0.188  0.617  0.194  0.418 
exp_k 0.095  0.711  0.088  0.457  -0.098  0.068  0.685  0.112  0.831 
exp_c_p 0.674  0.270  0.644  0.203  -0.168  0.745  0.203  0.656  0.301 
gov_p 0.477  0.249  0.398  0.325  0.581  0.525  0.233  0.392  0.328 
wages_p 0.290  0.364  0.392  0.730  -0.567  0.319  0.393  0.358  0.339 
Def 0.056  1.416  0.026  0.888  -0.911  0.044  0.814  0.011  1.145 
health ..  ..  0.020  0.514  ..  0.017  0.588  0.021  0.373 
Edu 0.024  0.565  0.032  0.378  0.475  0.041  0.329  0.038  0.498 
Sources of revenues 
grt_k  0.014 2.063 0.009  7.099 0.3538  0.014 2.621 0.008  5.342 
grt_c 0.006  3.351  0.017  1.737  0.322  0.006  2.429  0.006  4.694 
rev_ntx 0.027  1.134  0.043  0.977  0.442  0.028  1.149  0.042  1.383 
rev_ntx_p 0.154  1.060  0.214  0.835  -0.105  0.186  0.886  0.186  1.149 
Debt 
debt 0.559  0.926  1.313  0.581  1.003  0.997  0.687  0.678  1.055 
int_p 0.161  0.573  0.206  0.788  0.346  0.140  0.701  0.195  0.672 
Fiscal balance 
bal_ov_grt -0.049  -4.353  -0.043  -1.922  0.057  -0.072  -1.068  -0.082  -1.225 
bal_ov -0.062  -3.473  -0.072  -1.319  0.442  -0.081  -0.983  -0.091  -1.284 
bal_c_grt  0.031 6.556 0.038  2.018  0.079  -0.015 -4.767 0.031  2.927 
bal_c 0.018  11.287  0.012  7.429  -0.090  -0.023  -3.101  0.021  4.384 
bal_prim_grt 0.034  2.714  0.065  1.076  0.262  0.018  3.669  0.060  1.165 
bal_prim 0.016  5.728  0.035  2.282  -0.066  0.008  8.096  0.046  1.617 
                                
Note:  difference means that the variable is on average higher i SPC than in UPC. See appendix for variables definition and 
text for explanations on how variations within states (σ) and across states (s) are computed.  19 
 
 
Table 2: Probit analysis of successful and unsuccessful post-conflict transitions 
   I  II   III    IV  
polity ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.010 ‐ 0.011 ‐0.014  *** 
elections ‐ 0.044 ‐ 0.044 ‐ 0.068 ‐0.008 
ethnix ‐ 0.044  ** ‐ 0.137 ‐ 0.073 ‐0.101  ** 
gdp_pc  0.079  **  0.062 ‐ 0.087 ‐0.021 
growth ‐ 0.038 ‐ 0.050 ‐ 0.426 * ‐ 0.117 
exp ‐ 0.010  **  ..  .. .. 
gov_p  0.004  *  ..  .. .. 
wages_p ‐ 0.008  **  ..  .. .. 
rev  .. ‐ 0.002  .. .. 
rev_ntx_p  ..  0.005  *  .. .. 
grt_p_c  .. ‐ 0.949  **  .. .. 
debt  ..  .. ‐ 0.003 ***  .. 
int_p  ..  ..  0.083 .. 
bal_prim_grt  ..  ..  .. ‐0.010  ** 
N. Obs  94  96  74 89 
Wald chi  20.800  ***  16.7  **  26.3 ***  19.92  *** 
Pseudo R2  0.2213  0.105  0.328 0.319 
                         
Notes: the table reports marginal effects estimated from model (2)-(3), see text. The base outcome is SPC (= 0). 
All fiscal variables, gdp_pc and growth are all lagged by one period to control for possible endogeneity effects. 
See appendix for variables definition. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at usual confidence levels. 20 
 
 
Table 3: Differences between successful and unsuccessful post-conflict transition year-by-
year. 
      Years of post‐conflict transition 
      1  2  3  4  5 
Government size 
exp ‐ 0.050 ‐ 0.051 ‐ 0.063 ‐ 0.060 ‐ 0.042 
rev ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.007  0.006 
gov ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.048 ‐ 0.051 ‐ 0.042 
wages ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.005 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.010 ‐ 0.009 
Government scope 
exp_c ‐ 0.012 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.039 ‐ 0.044 ‐ 0.030 
exp_k ‐ 0.045 ‐ 0.020 ‐ 0.007 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.005 
exp_c_p  0.044 ‐ 0.002  0.005 ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.020 
gov_p ‐ 0.036 ‐ 0.074 ‐ 0.081 ‐ 0.093 ‐ 0.085 
wages_p  0.136  0.142  0.125  0.131  0.112 
def ‐ 0.072 ‐ 0.025  ..  ..  .. 
health  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
edu  0.077  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Sources of revenues 
grt_k ‐ 0.004  0.001  0.004  0.002 ‐ 0.009 
rev_ntx  0.002  0.007  0.008  0.010  0.016 
grt_c  0.004  0.008  0.008  0.010  0.012 
rev_ntx_p  0.046  0.040  0.042  0.061  0.085 
Debt 
debt  0.437  0.674  0.870  0.905  0.911 
int_p  0.049  0.060  0.087  0.062  0.071 
Fiscal balance 
bal_ov_grt ‐ 0.072 ‐ 0.002  0.017  0.031  0.032 
bal_ov ‐ 0.078 ‐ 0.014  0.005  0.015  0.013 
bal_c_grt ‐ 0.094 ‐ 0.009 ‐ 0.002  0.016  0.024 
bal_c ‐ 0.097 ‐ 0.018 ‐ 0.011  0.003  0.007 
bal_prim_grt ‐ 0.027  0.028  0.021  0.037  0.042 
bal_prim ‐ 0.028  0.024  0.015  0.026  0.025 
                    
Notes: the table reports the difference between the level of fiscal variables in  
SPC and UPC in the first five years of post-conflict transition (see text for details). The statistics in the 
table are computed as the simple difference between the corresponding SPC and UPC values of tables A3 
and A4 of the Appendix. A positive value indicates that the variable is higher in SPC than in UPC.  21 
 
Table 4. Average of fiscal variables in Successful post-conflicts, year-by-year 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
grt_k  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.015  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.010 
rev_ntx  0.033  0.040  0.039  0.039  0.041  0.043  0.044  0.046  0.044  0.042 
grt_c  0.014  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.018  0.017 
rev  0.167  0.181  0.186  0.188  0.193  0.202  0.208  0.211  0.210  0.209 
rev_ntx_p  0.216  0.229  0.221  0.219  0.222  0.227  0.226  0.225  0.217  0.208 
exp_c  0.140  0.151  0.155  0.154  0.157  0.159  0.162  0.165  0.166  0.165 
gov  0.086  0.088  0.089  0.088  0.089  0.090  0.092  0.095  0.098  0.099 
exp_k  0.062  0.070  0.073  0.072  0.075  0.078  0.081  0.085  0.088  0.090 
wages  0.046  0.048  0.049  0.049  0.051  0.052  0.053  0.055  0.056  0.056 
exp  0.208  0.224  0.231  0.228  0.234  0.240  0.245  0.252  0.256  0.257 
exp_c_p  0.714  0.696  0.684  0.679  0.674  0.666  0.661  0.653  0.645  0.639 
gov_p  0.431  0.410  0.402  0.397  0.395  0.391  0.392  0.394  0.398  0.400 
int_p  0.240  0.237  0.254  0.257  0.251  0.243  0.226  0.208  0.194  0.193 
wages_p  0.446  0.429  0.421  0.416  0.404  0.393  0.390  0.392  0.395  0.395 
debt  1.281  1.347  1.471  1.481  1.466  1.420  1.382  1.339  1.298  1.260 
def  0.029  0.035  0.031  0.029  0.026  0.024  0.023  0.025  0.026  0.026 
health  1.543  1.526  1.559  1.606  1.679  1.863  ..  ..  ..  .. 
edu  3.495  3.533  3.651  3.434  3.237  3.063  2.961  3.040  3.018  3.105 
bal_ov_grt ‐ 0.037 ‐ 0.039 ‐ 0.040 ‐ 0.035 ‐ 0.035 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.038 ‐ 0.044 ‐ 0.047 
bal_ov ‐ 0.059 ‐ 0.067 ‐ 0.070 ‐ 0.064 ‐ 0.065 ‐ 0.064 ‐ 0.063 ‐ 0.069 ‐ 0.073 ‐ 0.074 
bal_c_grt  0.024  0.028  0.028  0.030  0.033  0.039  0.042  0.040  0.037  0.037 
bal_c  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.006  0.011  0.013  0.011  0.010  0.011 
bal_prim_grt  0.045  0.053  0.057  0.059  0.061  0.070  0.072  0.068  0.063  0.062 
bal_prim  0.023  0.025  0.028  0.031  0.031  0.038  0.040  0.036  0.033  0.033 
                                
Notes: average of fiscal policy variables at years 1, 2..., 10 of successful post-conflict transitions.  All averages are computed over the 




Table 5. Average of fiscal variables in unsuccessful post-conflicts, year-by-year. 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
grt_k  0.020  0.014  0.012  0.013  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.014  0.012 
rev_ntx  0.031  0.033  0.032  0.029  0.024  0.021  0.019  ..  .. 
grt_c  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.003 
rev  0.185  0.186  0.201  0.194  0.187  0.170  0.159  ..  .. 
rev_ntx_p  0.169  0.189  0.179  0.159  0.137  0.126  0.119  ..  .. 
exp_c  0.153  0.183  0.194  0.198  0.187  0.169  0.157  0.146  0.138 
gov  0.101  0.125  0.137  0.139  0.131  0.121  0.115  0.107  0.102 
exp_k  0.107  0.090  0.079  0.074  0.080  0.090  0.096  0.098  0.102 
wages  0.051  0.053  0.058  0.059  0.060  0.053  0.049  ..  .. 
exp  0.258  0.275  0.294  0.288  0.276  0.261  0.247  ..  .. 
exp_c_p  0.670  0.698  0.679  0.694  0.693  0.658  0.642  ..  .. 
gov_p  0.467  0.484  0.483  0.490  0.480  0.467  0.470  ..  .. 
int_p  0.190  0.178  0.167  0.195  0.181  0.170  0.159  0.162  0.161 
wages_p  0.311  0.286  0.296  0.286  0.292  0.279  0.279  ..  .. 
debt  0.844  0.673  0.601  0.576  0.556  0.536  0.513  0.481  0.456 
def  0.101  0.060  0.053  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
health  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
edu  0.034  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
bal_ov_grt  0.035 ‐ 0.036 ‐ 0.057 ‐ 0.067 ‐ 0.067 ‐ 0.073 ‐ 0.073  ..  .. 
bal_ov  0.018 ‐ 0.053 ‐ 0.074 ‐ 0.079 ‐ 0.077 ‐ 0.082 ‐ 0.080  ..  .. 
bal_c_grt  0.118  0.037  0.030  0.014  0.009  0.007  0.006  ..  .. 
bal_c  0.101  0.020  0.013  0.001 ‐ 0.001 ‐ 0.002 ‐ 0.001  ..  .. 
bal_prim_grt  0.073  0.025  0.036  0.022  0.019  0.018  0.017  ..  .. 
bal_prim  0.051  0.001  0.012  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.007  ..  .. 
N. Of episodes  10  8  5  4  4  3  3  2  1 
                             
Notes: average of fiscal policy variables at years 1, 2..., 9 of unsuccessful post-conflict transitions. The bottom line of the table 
reports the number of episodes over which averages are computed. 23 
 
 
Figure 1: dynamics of selected fiscal policy variables in SPC and UPC 
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PANEL D 
Source: Author’s computations from data in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 